In a recent report published by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) on March 15, 2024, several safety concerns have been raised regarding an incident involving a Singapore Airlines (SIA) jet at Brisbane Airport in May 2022.
The incident, which occurred on May 27, 2022, involved the failure to remove covers from pitot probes on an Airbus A350 aircraft operated by SIA.
Pitot probes are essential components that provide airspeed data crucial for safe take-off and climb.
These probes are routinely covered during turnarounds at Brisbane Airport due to the risk of mud wasps building nests inside them within a short span of 20 minutes.
Credits to The Owner Via ATSB
According to the ATSB report, Heston MRO, SIA’s engineering maintenance contractor in Brisbane, failed to adhere to procedures by not removing the covers in a timely manner.
The covers were eventually removed just two minutes before the scheduled departure time, highlighting potential risks associated with inaccurate or absent airspeed readings.
Credits to The Owner Via ATSB
Moreover, the investigation revealed lapses in pre-flight inspections conducted by SIA flight crew.
CCTV footage analysis of five SIA turnarounds at Brisbane Airport indicated that these inspections were not fully completed as per SIA’s procedures, which require them to be conducted approximately 30 minutes before departure.
Although the flight crew should have observed the probe covers during these inspections, the ATSB emphasized the critical need for thorough and diligent inspections.
In response to these findings, SIA stated that it had issued memos and notices to its pilots emphasizing the importance of adhering to pre-flight inspection procedures.
Additionally, the airline announced measures to enhance visibility and lengthen probe covers and collaborated with Heston MRO to enforce stricter adherence to protocols.
The investigation also shed light on deficiencies in final walk-arounds conducted by Heston MRO.
While inspections were fully completed on certain days, they were omitted entirely on the day of the incident.
This failure to ensure the removal of probe covers before aircraft departure underscores the need for rigorous adherence to safety protocols.
Furthermore, the report highlighted concerns regarding the fatigue levels of staff, particularly the licensed aircraft maintenance engineer who held a dual role as Heston MRO’s regional manager for south-east Queensland.
The engineer admitted to being moderately tired on most days, raising concerns about the increased risk of fatigue-related incidents.
Heston MRO responded to the investigation by initiating a review of its tool control procedures and implementing measures to manage fatigue among its staff.
These include employing an independent regional manager without maintenance responsibilities and implementing timesheet submissions to monitor working hours.
As the investigation continues, stakeholders await further updates on the implementation of corrective actions to prevent similar incidents in the future. ST has reached out to Heston MRO for comment on these developments.